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Abstract. This paper addresses the design of an agent model for a social agent 
capable of understanding other agents in an empathic way. The model describes 
how the empathic agent deals with another agent’s mental states and the associ-
ated feelings, thus not only understanding the other agent’s mental state but at 
the same time feeling the accompanying emotion of the other agent. 
1   Introduction 
For functioning within a social context, one of the important issues is in how far 
agents have a good understanding of one another. Having understanding of another 
agent often is related to the notion of mindreading or Theory of Mind (ToM). This is a 
very wide notion, subsuming various foci of the understanding (such as attention, 
intention, desire, emotion, or belief states) and various methods for it, for example, 
based on the Theory Theory perspective or the Simulation Theory perspective as 
known from the philosophical literature; e.g., (Gärdenfors, 2003; Goldman, 2006). 
For humans, one of the deepest and most fundamental forms of mutual under-
standing is based on the notion of empathy; e.g., (Ickes, 1997; Hoffman, 2000; Pre-
ston and Waal, 2002; Decety and Jackson, 2004; Lamm, Batson, and Decety, 2007; 
Iacoboni, 2005, 2008). Originally (cf. Lipps, 1903) the notion of empathy was named 
by the German word ‘einfühlung’ which could be translated as ‘feeling into’; e.g., 
(Preston and Waal, 2002). As this word indicates more explicitly, the notion has a 
strong relation to feeling: empathic understanding is a form of understanding which 
includes (but is not limited to) feeling what the other person feels. This paper ad-
dresses how an agent can be designed that is able to have empathic understanding of 
other agents.  
A particular challenge here is how to relate understanding of any mental state (such 
as an attention, belief, desire or intention state) of another agent to a form of under-
standing which includes feeling the same emotion as the other agent. As one of the 
points of departure for an approach to address this challenge, Damasio (1999, 2004)’s 
theory was adopted, describing how any internal state or external stimulus provokes an 
emotion in the form of a bodily response that is felt via sensing this body state: a body 
loop. As a variant an as if body loop goes via preparations for a body state directly to a 
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sensory representation of this body state. As another point of departure the Simulation 
Theory perspective on mindreading (e.g., Goldman, 2006) was adopted, which as-
sumes that mindreading focussing on certain mental states of an observed agent makes 
use of the same mental states within the observing agent.  
In this paper, first the notion of empathy is clarified and positioned (Section 2) and 
Damasio’s theory on the generation of feelings is briefly introduced (Section 3). In 
Section 4 the designed agent model for empathic understanding is introduced and in 
Section 5 some simulation results are discussed. Finally, Section 6 is a discussion. 
2   Empathy and Different Types of Mindreading 
Empathy can be considered a specific type of mindreading. In the literature, empathy 
is described in different manners: 
 
• The ability to put oneself into the mental shoes of another person to understand 
his or her emotions and feelings (Goldman, 1993) 
• A complex form of psychological inference in which observation, memory, 
knowledge, and reasoning are combined to yield insights into the thoughts and 
feelings of others (Ickes, 1997) 
• An affective response more appropriate to someone else’s situation than to one’s 
own (Hoffman, 1982) 
• An affective response that stems from the apprehension or comprehension of  
another’s emotional state or condition, and which is similar to what the other 
person is feeling or would be expected to feel in the given situation (Eisenberg, 
2000) 
 
Recurring aspects in such descriptions are on the one hand understanding, having in-
sight in, apprehension or comprehension, and on the other hand feeling the state of the 
other person. Here the state of the other person may involve emotions felt and/or other 
mental states of the person. For the sake of simplicity, below notions such as under-
standing, having insight in, apprehension, comprehension, are indicated as under-
standing. For example, a person may understand but not feel an emotion felt by  
another person. These distinctions can be used more generally to obtain a form of 
classification of different types of mindreading that are possible. More specifically, 
mindreading can address three types of states of an observed person: 
 
(a) Emotions felt by the person 
(b) Other mental states (e.g., attention states, desire, intention, belief states) 
(c) Both emotion states and other mental states 
 
Moreover, this not only applies to a person who is observed but also to a person per-
forming the observing. In particular, a person can understand or feel another person’s 
state, or both. Given this, mindreading of another person’s state can take three forms: 
 
(1) Feeling the state of another person without understanding it 
(2) Understanding the state of another person without feeling it 
(3) Both understanding and feeling the state of another person  
 
As the other person’s state may involve emotions felt and/or other mental states, the 
combination of these provides the matrix of possibilities as shown in Table 1. 
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For example, the possibility indicated as type (1a), ‘feeling but not understanding 
another person’s emotion’, is a case of emotion contagion as often occurs in the inter-
action between persons (e.g., Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson, 1994). Here the emo-
tion felt by one person is mirrorred in the emotion felt in the other person. Another 
specific case is type (2c): ‘understanding but not feeling another person’s emotions 
and other mental states’. This is a case that is often assumed to occur in psychopaths 
who have well-developed skills in mindreading and apply them to their victims 
thereby serving their own interest, but do not mirror the feelings of their victims (cf. 
Raine, 1993, pp. 159-165; Blair, 2005). Yet other specific cases are type (2b) which 
subsumes classicical cases described by the Theory Theory perspective on mindread-
ing (e.g., Goldman, 2006; Bosse, Memon, and Treur, 2007), and type (2a) that sub-
sumes approaches based on dedicated emotion recognition methods, for example, 
from facial expressions; e.g., (Pantic  and Rothkrantz, 2000).  
Table 1. Different types of mindreading 
Observed person 
Observing person 
Other person’s 
emotions felt 
(a) 
Other person’s 
other mental states 
(b) 
Other person’s  
emotions felt and 
other mental states (c) 
Feeling but  
not understanding 
(1) 
Feeling but not  
understanding another  
person’s emotion  
Feeling but not  
understanding  another  
person’s belief, desire, 
 intention, attention, … 
Feeling but not  
understanding another  
person’s emotions and  
other mental states 
Understanding but  
not feeling 
(2) 
Understanding but not 
 feeling another  
person’s emotion  
Understanding but not  
feeling another  
person’s belief, desire, 
intention, attention, … 
Understanding but not  
feeling another  
person’s emotions and  
other mental states 
Both understanding  
and feeling 
(3) 
Understanding and  
feeling another 
 person’s emotion  
Understanding and  
feeling another  
person’s belief, desire, 
intention, attention, … 
Understanding and  
feeling another 
 person’s emotions and  
other mental states 
 
 
Some of the descriptions of the notion of empathy (e.g., in the descriptions from 
(Goldman, 1993; Hoffman, 1982; Eisenberg, 2000) quoted above) concentrate on 
feelings and mirrorring them, which could be described as being subsumed by type 
(1a) or (3a). However, other descriptions explicitly involve thoughts as well, of both 
the observed and observing person (e.g., Ickes, 1997), which makes them subsumed 
by type (3c). In the current paper this more extended (and challenging) notion of em-
pathy is taken as the aim. Here an extra aspect is that feelings and other mental states 
are interrelated: usually any mental state of a person that by itself is not an emotion 
state (for example, a belief, desire, intention or attention state) induces or goes to-
gether with a certain emotion state. For example, a belief that something bad is to 
happen, may relate to feeling fear, or the belief that something good has happened 
may relate to feeling happiness. Another example of such a relationship is the role of 
cognitive elements (for example, certain thoughts) in the development, persistence 
and recurrence of mood disorders such as depressions; e.g., (Ingram, Miranda & 
Segal, 1998). 
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3   Relating Mental States to Emotions Felt 
A question that may arise from the distinctions made in the previous section is 
whether it is possible to feel a state of another person which by itself is not a feeling, 
for example, a belief state. An answer to this involves the way in which any mental 
state in a person induces emotions felt within this person, as described by Damasio 
(1999, 2004); e.g.: 
 
‘Even when we somewhat misuse the notion of feeling – as in “I feel I am 
right about this” or “I feel I cannot agree with you” – we are referring, at least 
vaguely, to the feeling that accompanies the idea of believing a certain fact or 
endorsing a certain view. This is because believing and endorsing cause a cer-
tain emotion to happen. As far as I can fathom, few if any exceptions of any 
object or event, actually present or recalled from memory, are ever neutral in 
emotional terms. Through either innate design or by learning, we react to 
most, perhaps all, objects with emotions, however weak, and subsequent feel-
ings, however feeble.’ (Damasio, 2004, p. 93) 
 
From this perspective, if any mental state of an observed person is mirrorred within an 
observing person, by an (assumingly) similar mechanism the associated feeling can 
also be generated within the observing person. In principle, this can even happen for 
the case where the observed person has a damaged neural structure causing that this 
associated feeling is not generated. In this case the observing person can feel the other 
person’s state, whereas the person himself does not feel it. For example, if such a per-
son believes he has won a lottery, he may not feel happiness about it, whereas an ob-
serving agent may mirror such a belief and based on that may generate the accompa-
nying feeling of happiness. 
In some more detail, emotion generation via a body loop roughly proceeds ac-
cording to the following causal chain; see Damasio (1999, 2004): 
 
having a mental state      →  preparation for the induced bodily response      →  
induced bodily response        →  sensing the induced bodily response           →   
sensory representation of the induced bodily response     →  induced feeling 
 
As a variation, an ‘as if body loop’ uses a direct causal relation 
preparation for the induced bodily response →  
sensory representation of the induced bodily response 
as a shortcut in the causal chain. In the model used here an essential addition is that 
the body loop (or as if body loop) is extended to a recursive body loop (or recursive 
as if body loop) by assuming that the preparation of the bodily response is also af-
fected by the state of feeling the emotion:  
 
feeling   →    preparation for  the bodily response   
 
as an additional causal relation. Such recursiveness is also assumed by Damasio 
(2004), as he notices that what is felt by sensing is actually a body state which is an 
internal object, under control of the person: 
 Designing Social Agents with Empathic Understanding 283 
‘The brain has a direct means to respond to the object as feelings unfold be-
cause the object at the origin is inside the body, rather than external to it. The 
brain can act directly on the very object it is perceiving. It can do so by modi-
fying the state of the object, or by altering the transmission of signals from it. 
The object at the origin on the one hand, and the brain map of that object on 
the other, can influence each other in a sort of reverberative process that is not 
to be found, for example, in the perception of an external object.’ (…) 
   ‘In other words, feelings are not a passive perception or a flash in time, 
especially not in the case of feelings of joy and sorrow. For a while after an 
occasion of such feelings begins – for seconds or for minutes – there is a dy-
namic engagement of the body, almost certainly in a repeated fashion, and a 
subsequent dynamic variation of the perception. We perceive a series of transi-
tions. We sense an interplay, a give and take.’ (Damasio, 2004, pp. 91-92) 
 
Thus the obtained model is based on reciprocal causation relations between emotion 
felt and body states, as roughly shown in Figure 1. 
feeling
mental 
state
body
state
sensed
body state
recursive
body loop
 
Fig. 1.  Recursive body loop induced by a given mental state 
Both the bodily response and the feeling are assigned a level or gradation, ex-
pressed by a number, which is assumed dynamic; for example, the strength of a smile 
and the extent of happiness. The causal cycle is modelled as a positive feedback loop, 
triggered by the (any) mental state and converging to a certain level of feeling and 
body state. Here in each round of the cycle the next body state has a level that is af-
fected by both the mental state and the level of the feeling state, and the next level of 
the feeling is based on the level of the body state. 
4   Description of the Designed Agent Model  
The design of the mindreading capability for the empathic agent was based on the 
Simulation Theory perspective; cf. (Goldman, 2006). According to this perspective 
mindreading is performed by the observing agent by activating the same own mental 
states as the observed agent, thereby using similar mechanisms as those used by the 
observed agent. Therefore, a first step is the design of the basic mechanisms to gener-
ate a mental state (here en belief state was chosen), and to generate the associated 
feelings. These basic mechanisms will be used by both agents. 
In the description of the detailed agent model the temporal relation a →  b denotes 
that when a state property a occurs, then after a certain time delay (which for each 
relation instance can be specified as any positive real number), state property b will 
occur. In this language (called LEADSTO) both logical and numerical calculations 
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can be specified, and a dedicated software environment is available to support specifi-
cation and simulation; for details see (Bosse, Jonker, Meij & Treur, 2007).  
A lottery scenario is used to illustrate the model. Agent A observes both his own 
lot number and the winning number and creates the corresponding beliefs; as the 
number in both beliefs is the same, from these the belief that the lottery was won is 
generated, which leads to an associated feeling of happiness. By communication 
agent B hears from agent A about the own lot number and the winning number. From 
this he simulates the process in agent A thus entering an empathic understanding 
process in which she generates both the belief about the lottery won and the associ-
ated feeling. For an overview of the model for agent A, see Figure 2. An overview of 
the model of agent B is depicted in Figure 3. These pictures also show representa-
tions from the detailed specifications explained below. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Overview of the agent model for the observed agent A 
The detailed specification (both informally and formally) of the agent model for 
empathic understanding is presented below. Here capitals are used for (assumed uni-
versally quantified) variables, e.g. ‘B’, whereas small letters represents an instance of 
that variable, e.g. ‘b’. All aspects have been formalized numerically by numbers in 
the interval [0, 1]. First the part is presented that describes the basic mechanisms to 
generate a belief state (on winning the lottery) and the associated feeling (of happi-
ness). These are used by both agents. The first dynamic property addresses how 
properties of the world state can be sensed. 
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LP1  Sensing a world state 
If world state property W occurs of level V 
then a sensor state for W of level V will occur. 
world_state(W, V) →   sensor_state(W, V) 
 
This dynamic property is used by agent A to observe both the own number and the 
winning number (see Figure 2); to this end the variable W is instantiated by 
own_number(x) and winning_number(x). Note that communications are also considered 
world facts; LP1 is used by agent B by instantiating W for communications indicated 
as communicated_by_to(I, agentA, agentB). From this sensory representations and beliefs 
are generated according to the next two dynamic properties LP2 and LP3. Note that 
also for these the variable W is instantiated as before. 
 
LP2  Generating a sensory representation for a sensed world state 
If a sensor state for world state property W with level V occurs,  
then a sensory representation for W with level V will occur. 
sensor_state(W, V)  →   srs(W, V) 
 
LP3  Generating a belief state for a sensory representation 
If a sensory representation for W with level V occurs,  
then a belief for W with level V will occur. 
srs(W, V)  →    belief(W, V) 
 
Dynamic property LP4 describes how the belief is generated that the lottery was won. 
 
LP4  Generating a belief on winning the lottery 
If a belief with level V1 occurs that X is the main price winning number of the lottery 
and a belief with level V2 occurs that X is the number of the own lot 
then a belief with level 0.5V1+0.5V2  will occur that the main price of the lottery was won 
belief(winning_number(X), V1)  &  belief(own_number(X), V2)  →     
belief(lottery_won, 0.5V1+0.5V2) 
 
The emotional response to this belief is the preparation for a specific bodily reaction 
b, as expressed in dynamic property LP5. 
 
LP5  From belief that lottery was won and feeling to preparation of a specific body state 
If a belief that the lottery was won with level V1 occurs and feeling body state b has level V2,  
then preparation state for body state b will occur with level 0.5V1+0.5V2. 
belief(lottery_won, V1) &  feeling(b, V2)  →   preparation_state(b, 0.5V1+0.5V2) 
 
Dynamic properties LP6 to LP10 describe the body loop. 
 
LP6  From preparation to effector state for body modification 
If preparation state for body state B occurs with level V, 
then the effector state for body state B with level V will occur. 
preparation_state(B, V)  →   effector_state(B, V) 
 
LP7  From effector  state to modified body 
If the effector state for body state B with level V occurs, 
then the body state B with level V will occur. 
effector_state(B, V)  →   body_state(B, V) 
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LP8  Sensing a body state 
If body state B with level V occurs, 
then this body state B with level V will be sensed. 
body_state(B, V)   →    sensor_state(B, V) 
 
LP9  Generating a sensory representation of a body state 
If body state B with level V is sensed,  
then a sensory representation for body state B with level V will occur. 
sensor_state(B, V)   →    srs(B, V) 
 
LP10  From sensory representation of body state to feeling 
If a sensory representation for body state B with level V occurs, 
then B is felt with level V. 
srs(B, V)  →    feeling(B, V) 
 
Fig. 3. Overview of the agent model for the observing agent B 
Above the part of the model was shown that is used by both the observed and observ-
ing agent. Next the part of the model is discussed that is particularly involved in the 
empathic understanding process. This part of the model is used within the observing 
agent; see Figure 3.  
First the communication from the other agent is related to the own beliefs. 
 
LP11   Affecting own beliefs by communicated information 
If in agent B a sensory representation with level V occurs that agent A communicated world fact W,  
then a belief with level V for this world fact will occur.  
srs(communicated_by_to (W, agentA, agentB), V)  →   belief(W, V)   
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Next it is shown how the imputation process takes place for a belief. Here, th is a 
(constant) threshold for imputation. In the simulations shown, th is assumed 0.95 as 
an example. 
 
LP12   Imputation of a belief 
If a  belief  that the lottery was won with level V1≥ th occurs  
and a belief occurs with level V2≥th  that the own number was communicated by agentA,  
and a belief occurs with level V3≥th  that the winning number was communicated by agentA, 
then the belief that the lottery was won will imputed. 
belief(lottery_won, V1)  &  
belief(communicated_by_to(own_number(X1), agentA, agentB), V2)  &   
belief(communicated_by_to(winning_number(X2), agentA, agentB), V3) &   
V1≥th &  V2≥th & V3≥th 
→   imputation(belief(lottery_won), agentA) 
 
Finally, feelings are imputed in the following manner. 
 
LP13   Imputation of a feeling 
If a certain body state B is felt, with level V1≥ th  
and a belief occurs with level V2≥th  that the own number was communicated by agentA,  
and a belief occurs with level V3≥th  that the winning number was communicated by agentA, 
then feeling B will imputed.  
feeling(B, V1) & 
belief(communicated_by_to(own_number(X1), agentA, agentB), V2)  &   
belief(communicated_by_to(winning_number(X2), agentA, agentB), V3) &   
V1≥th &  V2≥th & V3≥th 
→   imputation(feeling(B), agentA) 
5   Example Simulation Results 
Based on the model described in the previous section, a number of simulations have 
been performed. Some example simulation traces are included in this section as an 
illustration; see Figure 4 and Figure 5 (here the time delays within the temporal 
LEADSTO relations were taken 1 time unit). In all of these figures, where time is on 
the horizontal axis, the upper part shows the time periods, in which the binary logical 
state properties hold (indicated by the dark lines); for example, 
 
world_state(winning_number(X), 1)  
belief(lottery_won, 1.0)  
imputation(feeling(b), agentA)  
 
Below this part, quantitative information for the other state properties values for the 
different time periods are shown (by the dark lines). For example, in Figure 4, the 
preparation state for b has value 0.5 at time point 6 which increased to 0.75 at time 
point 12 and so forth. The graphs show how the recursive body loop approximates a 
state for feeling with value 1. Notice that in all lower 6 traces i.e. from preparation 
state to feeling state, the states are activated based on temporal delay between them, 
as depicted in Figure 2,  i.e. preparation state has activation level ‘0’ at time point 0, 
the successor state effector state has activation level ‘0’ at time point 1 and so on. 
Figure 4 shows the simulation for the observed agent based on the basic mecha-
nisms to generate a belief state and to generate the associated feeling as described in 
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the previous section (from LP1 to LP10). As shown in Figure 4 (upper part), the ob-
served agent A notices his own number and the winning number from the world state, 
shown by the state properties 
 
sensor_state(own_number(X), 1) 
 
and  
 
sensor_state(winning_number(X), 1) 
 
respectively. It then generates the belief that he has won the lottery by comparing the 
two numbers shown by the state property  
 
belief(lottery_won(X), 1.0) 
 
The lower part of Figure 4 shows the values of the various activation levels over time. 
Here it is shown that the recursive body loop results in an approximation of conver-
gent activation levels for the states that relate to the feeling and the body state, among 
others. 
Figure 5 shows a simulation trace for the observing agent, depicting the empathic 
understanding process described in the previous section (in particular using LP11 to 
LP13, but also using LP1 to LP10 for the underlying basic mechanism). Here it is 
shown (in the upper part of the Figure 5) that agent A (observed agent) communicates 
his own number and winning number to the agent B (observing agent), shown by the 
state properties  
 
sensor_state(communicated_by_to  
(own_number(X), agentA, agentB), 1)  
 
and  
 
sensor_state(communicated_by_to  
(winning_number(X), agentA, agentB), 1)  
 
respectively. Stepping in the shoes of agent A, then agent B (the observing agent) 
generates its own beliefs about the lot numbers and about winning lottery belief 
(which mirror the beliefs of agent A), as shown by the state property  
 
belief(lottery_won, 1.0).  
 
Later agent B imputes this belief (at time point 5) to agent A as shown by state 
property  
 
imputation(belief(lottery_won), agentA).  
 
As shown in the figure, after generating the associated feeling, agent B also imputes 
this feeling to agent A, shown by the state property  
 
imputation(feeling(b), agentA)  
 
at time point 35. 
 Designing Social Agents with Empathic Understanding 289 
 
Fig. 4. Example simulation trace for the observed agent 
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Fig. 5. Example simulation trace for the observing agent 
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6   Discussion 
For an agent observing another agent, having an empathic understanding of the ob-
served agent is considered a specific type of mindreading. Mindreading as such can 
focus on certain aspects such as emotion, desire, belief, intention, or attention states 
(e.g., Gärdenfors, 2003). A characteristic of an empathic response is that the response 
does not only include that the observing agent understands the mental state of the ob-
served agent, but also feels the corresponding feeling. In this paper the design of an 
agent model was introduced that is capable of understanding other agents in an em-
pathic way. The model describes how the empathic agent does not only understand 
another agent’s mental state but at the same time feels the accompanying emotion. 
The proposed model is an extension of an earlier model described in (Bosse, Memon, 
and Treur, 2009) which does not focus on the more complex issue of empathic under-
standing, but only on reading  another person’s emotions. The model proposed in the 
current paper was based on two main assumptions: 
 
(1) The observing agent performs mindreading using the same mental states as the 
observed agent 
(2) Both agents have a similar mechanism to associate feelings to a given mental 
state 
 
Concerning assumption (1), to obtain a form of mindreading for which the observing 
agent generates the same mental state, the Simulation Theory perspective was fol-
lowed; cf. (Goldman, 2006). According to this perspective mindreading is performed 
by the observing agent in a simulative manner by activating the same mental states as 
the observed agent; see also (Hesslow, 2002). This assumption is recently getting 
more and more support by empirical results, for example, concerning the discovery of 
the mirror neuron system; e.g., (Rizzolatti  and Craighero, 2004; Iacoboni, Molnar-
Szakacs, Gallese, Buccino, Mazziotta, and Rizzolatti, 2005; Iacoboni, 2005, 2008; 
Pineda, 2009; Goldman, 2009). 
Concerning assumption (2), to this end a computational model of Damasio (1999, 
2004)’s informal theory about the generation of emotion and feeling was exploited. 
This theory assumes a neural mechanism that involves changes in an agent’s sensed 
body state, triggered by a certain mental state. Assuming that the observed agent and 
the observing agent indeed have a similar mechanism for this, makes it possible that 
for a given mental state the observing agent generates the same feeling as the ob-
served agent.  
Especially in relation to assumption (2) it can be questioned to which extent the 
mechanisms to associate feelings to a given mental state are the same for both agents. 
As it may be considered plausible that basically the mechanisms are similar, it is not 
difficult to imagine that due to innate and learned individual differences, the empathic 
reaction may be limited in extent. Indeed, it is often reported that identical twins have 
a much higher level of mutual empathy than any two persons which are not identical 
twins. Moreover, it is also often considered that more empathy is shown between two 
persons when they have had similar experiences in life. Nevertheless, a certain extent 
of empathy still seems possible between persons which are not genetically identical 
and have not exactly the same experiences. It is an interesting challenge for future 
research to develop the introduced model for empathy further by introducing explicit 
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parameters by which such individual differences can be expressed, and for which 
some notion of extent to which empathy occurs can be defined. 
Other models described in the literature usually only address either emotion rec-
ognition, or recognition of another type of mental state, or feel another persons feel-
ing; e.g., (Pantic  and Rothkrantz, 2000; Goldman, 2006; Bosse, Memon, and Treur, 
2007; Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson, 1994). As far as the authors know the model 
proposed here is unique in the sense that it combines both understanding and feeling 
of another person’s mental states, and takes into account the way in which (other) 
mental states induce feelings both for the observing and the observed person. 
Future work will address a more extensive evaluation and assessment of the model 
and thereby will explore more variations, for example, of different scenarios with 
different extents of similarity between the persons, and different values of its parame-
ters such as the threshold value and the weight factors, for example in the generation 
of the preparation and the belief which were now taken 0.95 and 0.5 respectively. 
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